Security internals
Last updated 17 November 2026
A Machine’s disks and its Volume are encrypted wherever they are stored, each Machine runs in a virtual machine of its own, and deleting a Volume destroys its key before its data. This page explains how: which keys protect a Machine’s disks and its Volume, who can use each key, what keeps Machines apart, and what a deletion destroys. Data protection says the same for every product in fewer words, with what encryption does not protect against.
Tonbo’s key for the region, in AWS KMS
(only the service that runs Machines may use it)
│
└── wraps one data key per Volume
├── its copy in S3: compressed, then AES-256-GCM
└── its copy on the host: AES-256-XTS, an HMAC per sector
A Machine’s own disks: the host’s local drives, encrypted in the
host’s hardware under keys that never leave itThe keys
Tonbo keeps one key in AWS Key Management Service (KMS) for the Machines of each region. It never leaves KMS, and its policy refuses every caller but the service that runs Machines in that region, and any use of it that does not come through the region’s private network. For each Volume that service asks KMS for a data key of its own, bound to your account and to what it protects, and stores it only wrapped by the region’s key. It unwraps a data key only when a Machine needs it, and hands it to the program on the host that uses it, which keeps it in memory only. AWS rotates the region’s key once a year.
Each secret you give a Machine is encrypted under a data key of its own too, made from a separate key kept for secrets (see Machines on Data protection).
A Machine’s own disks
A Machine’s root and scratch disks are files on its host’s local NVMe drives. Tonbo adds no encryption of its own to them: the host encrypts everything written to them in hardware, with AES-256-XTS, under keys that are made inside a hardware module on the host, never leave it, and are destroyed when the host is stopped or terminated (see AWS’s description). A drive read outside its running host, or after the host has ended, holds only ciphertext under a key that no longer exists.
The disks last for one wake, and are deleted when it ends. The host’s filesystem never gives a deleted file’s blocks to another file, so no later Machine on the host reads them (see Isolation guarantees).
Volumes
Tonbo encrypts a Volume itself, before any of it is stored. What goes to Amazon S3 is compressed, then encrypted with AES-256-GCM, which also detects any change to it, and S3 encrypts the object again with its own key. The copy on the Machine’s host, which every read and write goes to, is encrypted with AES-256-XTS sector by sector, and each sector carries an HMAC-SHA-256 code that is checked before the sector is decrypted: a sector that fails the check is never served. Both use keys derived from the Volume’s data key, and only the program on the host that serves the Volume to its Machine ever holds them. A Machine whose whole disk is a Volume (see Keep a Machine’s whole disk) has every file outside its scratch paths protected this way.
What keeps Machines apart
Each wake runs in a Firecracker microVM of its own, on KVM, started by Firecracker’s jailer as an unprivileged process in its own namespaces and cgroup, behind a seccomp filter. The isolation claims Tonbo signs, and where each is enforced, are on Isolation claims; the virtual machine’s drives and boot are on The microVM.
What the host can see
Tonbo’s software on the host starts your Machine and serves its disks and its Volume, so root on a running host can read the Machine’s memory and disks, and the keys the host holds in memory. The encryption on this page protects what is left on drives, in S3 and in backups; it does not hide a running Machine from its own host, and Machines do not run on confidential-computing hardware that would. No crash dump of a Machine’s virtual machine or of Tonbo’s host agent is written to disk. What Tonbo’s software reads about your Machines, which counts and times their work and never reads their memory, disks or requests to do so, is on What we observe.
What a deletion destroys
Deleting a Machine deletes its disks. A Volume attached to it is detached and kept (see Delete a Machine), unless it was made as the Machine’s whole disk and you delete it with the Machine (see Delete the Machine, with or without its disk).
Deleting a Volume, which Tonbo refuses while a Machine uses it, runs in a fixed order. Tonbo destroys the stored copy of the Volume’s data key first, then deletes its objects from S3 until none are left, then its log of changes, and last records that the deletion is complete. Its copy on a host is deleted once its key is gone. S3 keeps no earlier versions of a Volume’s objects, so a deleted object is gone at once. The database backups that still hold the wrapped key expire within 14 days.
Deleting your account deletes every Machine and Volume of your personal account the same way, and the deletion does not finish until each Volume’s has (see Delete your account). What happens to databases and streams, which storage erases within 30 days, is under What this does not protect against, and what Tonbo keeps after an account is deleted is in section 6 of the Privacy Policy.